The operations in which the Roumanians are engaged fall into two main strategic theatres – the Transylvanian and the Dobrudjan. According to the latest tidings, success in one region is counterbalanced by failure in another.
The attempt of Marshal von Mackensen to cut the Costanza-Chernavoda railway has, at any rate for the present, definitely failed. It was a well-conceived plan – as we might expect of anything formed by that able commander, but at best its chances of success were somewhat remote. Also it is probable that the German Field Marshal was hampered by the growing scarcity of human material in the Central Empires. His whole force has been estimated at about 100,000 infantry, and its composition – Germans, Bulgars, and Turks – was heterogeneous. Doubtless it represented the best that von Mackensen could do.
The fall of Turtukai and the evacuation of Silistria had the effect of stimulating the Roumanians to a great effort. Reinforcements were ordered to the threatened front, and General Alexander Averescu, generally reputed the most brilliant of the Roumanian leaders, was called to take the chief command. His army was also somewhat heterogeneous, comprising, besides Roumanians and General Zaïonchkovski's Russians, a force of Serb volunteers.
General Averescu posted his army along a front from ten to fifteen miles south of the railway – his right in front of Rasova, protected by the Roumanian Danube monitors, his centre across the Dobrudja Central Railway near Kobadinu, his left at Tuzla on the coast.
The battle began on 17 September. Marshal von Mackensen made his main attack on his left to throw back the Allies upon Chernavoda and seize the bridges. But his troops could make no headway, the Roumanians resisting with great gallantry, well supported by the flanking fire of three monitors. Attacks in the centre about Kobadinu had no better results, and some trenches, which were momentarily captured, were speedily retaken by the Allies, whose line in this direction included the Serbs. The enemy losses were very great, and the Serbs alone speak of eight guns and 5,000 rifles captured. Late on 19 September Averescu developed a powerful counter-attack on his own left. Von Mackensen's right, heavily attacked, was broken and retreated in disorder, and the retrograde movement spread down the line. Von Mackensen succeeded in steadying the retreat, but when he brought his line to a halt he was twelve or fourteen miles in rear of the battle front on 19 September. There has been fighting at various points on this new line, but, though the Germano-Bulgars have been strengthened sufficiently to make local attacks, they have regained no ground.
The Second Roumanian Army in Eastern Transylvania continued to make steady progress up to the end of September. Over a third of Transylvania was in its hands, including the town of Szekely Udvarhely, important as a centre of the Tartar Tzeklers, who are likely to be the only resolute opponents of a Roumanian occupation. Seven thousand prisoners and large spoils had been captured.
Meanwhile, however, the First Army in the Petroseny-Hermannstadt region had been less successful, owing to a strong counter-attack under the command of General von Falkenhayn the recently-superseded chief of the German General Staff. The accounts of the fighting are not easy to reconcile, but it appears that the Vulkan Pass was first captured by the Austro-Germans, then retaken by the Roumanians about 25 September. On 30 September von Falkenhayn made an attack on the Roumanian forces south of Hermannstadt, combining his frontal advance with an encircling movement upon the Roter Thurm Pass. The pass, which was weakly guarded, was captured with all the trains passing through it; and the Roumanians were forced to fall back to the eastward towards Fogaras, with the loss of thirteen guns and a number of prisoners. After three days' fighting they succeeded, according to their own account, in re-establishing their line and again opening communication with the south. This indicates a retreat of that part of their line south and south-east of Hermannstadt. A retreat southwards is admitted. The result is a distinct Austro-German success, but there is no indication that it is of any but local importance. Edward Foord