[Speech delivered in the Bechstein Hall, London, on March 22, 1914.]
Ladies and Gentlemen:— The occasion of our meeting this afternoon is to hear a lecture from my friend Mr. Buchan on the strategy of the war, and he is sure to make it informing and interesting. His friends know him as a man of fine public spirit and patriotism, in whom a crisis such as this in his country's history arouses the noblest feelings. I am sorry that an engagement makes it necessary for me to return soon to the Foreign Office, and therefore it will be a great disappointment to me not to hear the whole of the lecture. I should like to take the opportunity to make my apology now, and also to make one or two remarks on the origin and issues of the war. [Hear, hear.] We are engaged in considering the particular methods by which the war may be prosecuted to a successful conclusion, but do not let us lose sight even for a moment of the character and origin of this war and of the main issues for which we are fighting. Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been maimed and wounded in Europe during the last few months. All this might have been avoided by the simple method of a conference or a joint discussion between the Powers concerned, which might have been held in London, at The Hague, or wherever and in whatever form Germany would have consented to have it. It would have been far easier to have settled by conference the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which Germany made the occasion for this war, than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of two years ago, Germany knew from her experience of the conference in London which settled the Balkan crisis that she could count upon our good will for peace in any conference of the Powers. We had sought no diplomatic triumph in the Balkan Conference; we did not give ourselves to any intrigue; we pursued, impartially
