i6o The Great War great military strength. A second Austrian defeat might well destroy the whole army, a Russian re- verse or even temporary repulse would probably mean delay of Russian advance until the first crisis in France had long passed. The problem of the following days was necessarily whether the Austrian reverse had shaken the morale of the Dual Kingdom's army. If It had the course of the war In the East, so far as Austria was con- cerned, might be decided in the next great battle, or indeed, without another major engagement, if the retreat passed the San. Again it is necessary to examine the situation in the whole field of the conflict to estimate the full value of the Austrian defeat to the Allies. While the Germans were still sixty miles from Paris and a decisive battle had not yet been fought, the main Austrian field army was In distress, had met with disaster about Lemberg; five corps had been crushed, half the Austrian force in that region. Unsup- ported, the Austrian army might be annihilated. Now it was necessary to send east, not alone the two Austrian corps, hitherto aiding In the attack upon France, but five German corps. To make the matter worse, here was a Servian army, having routed four more Austrian corps at the Jedar, driving north for Hungary. Having sent seven corps east, two to East Prussia, four to Galicia, the advantage of numbers was no longer with the Germans In France. Five corps