General J of re's Strategy 167 destroy France before Russia came up, leave second line troops to hold France until her first line, sent east, had crushed Russia, and then complete the con- quest of France. At the outset she was able to put into France numbers equal to her foes. But in the sixth week, of the war she was now outnumbered alike in France and on the Russian frontier, the Austrian army had been terribly punished, if not destroyed, and the French Army, superior in number, steadily reenforced from England, was recovering from the consequences of the first reckless dispersal incident to the counter-offensive. It was still possible in the first week of September that a great German victory might restore the bal- ance in France, it was equally possible that French strategy might contemplate still further retreat, a stand behind the Loire, until the Russian army had completed its concentration. But what was abso- lutely plain now was that before the first great battle of the war had been fought, the Allies had estab- lished a positive superiority of numbers at the de- cisive point, while battle losses, extension of lines, exhaustion following tremendous efforts had weak- ened the Germans. To accomplish this result the French had sacrificed provinces and surrendered cities. All northern France had been abandoned to the Germans. Such a strategy presupposed a strong man as commander and a confident nation, utterly willing to abide by the consequences of its military chief's plans. In a