178 The Great War toward Paris, Invest it and, with the assistance of siege guns brought up from Metz, reduce it and open a short way from Germany to northern France from Metz to Rheims, which should relieve the Germans of the Intolerable burden of garrisoning Belgium to protect the long lines of communications across a hostile country on which they still depended for sup- plies and reenforcements. To the American this change in plan is best de- scribed by recalling the course of Lee at Gettysburg. On the second day the whole weight of his attack was on Meade's left, his necessity to get Round Top, roll up the left, and dispose of the Union army. By a narrow margin he failed and on the third day his ' effort was to break the center against which he launched Pickett in his famous charge. General von Kluck's manoeuvre before Paris was the decisive movement. If the French and British who had fought him from Mons to the Marne had been crushed, If the garrison of Paris were too in- significant to need more than a few flank guards to hold it back, then the arrival of von Kluck on the left of the French centre and between It and Paris might insure a tremendous advantage — the centre might be expected to sag, break and let the German flood go swirling between Paris and the eastern forts irresistibly. But If the Anglo-French left were not shaken, if the Paris garrison were strong enough to take the offensive, if, above all, the French high command