German Disaster 183 campaign as In 18 14 had after a magnificent struggle led to complete disaster. Napoleon tackled his problem in precisely the fashion the Kaiser's General Staff subsequently adopted. He launched his whole military force at the Allied armies In Belgium as the Germans did subsequently at France. The supreme test for Na- poleon was at Waterloo; for the Germans, at the Battle of the Marne. In both cases the desperate game, the staking of all on a single throw, failed. In Napoleon's case the failure was a rout, the utter destruction of his army. In the German case It was a repulse, followed by a rapid retreat of nearly a hundred miles. Yet, if the Germans had saved their army, as soon became unmistakable, this could not blind the observer to the extent of their disaster. The very importance they attached to their terrific, desperate drive at France demonstrated this. To get at France promptly they violated the neutrality of Bel- gium. Not even the certainty that this step would bring the British In against them could counterbal- ance the imperious necessity of crushing France be- fore Russia got up. Six weeks from the declaration of war was the ex- treme time German military authorities had believed they would have In which to crush France before the onrush of the Russians in the East would demand the recall of German troops from France, the deple- tion of the invading army to a point where, if France