Mobilization 33 riving, that is, 700,000 men reinforced by the garri- sons of the fortresses. To counterbalance the disparity in strength be- tween French and German forces from the tenth to the twentieth days of mobihzation, that is, before the slower Russian mobihzation had been achieved, the French rehed upon the remarkable line of forts and entrenched camps, upon the possibility of the arrival of the English " expeditionary army " of up- ward of 150,000 and upon the advantage that always rests with the defender. It was clear then that all European military writers expected that following declarations of war Germany would rapidly concentrate upon the French frontier and by virtue of superior numbers seek, to crush the smaller French field force and penetrate the Toul-Verdun-Epinal barrier before Russian pres- sure in the east recalled several army corps, provided always the offensive through Belgium were not at- tempted, a contingency only to be met when German operations began. As for Austria, with her smaller army, it had been expected that she would put sixteen army corps on the Polish frontier of Russia, based on Cracow, Lemberg, and the first class fortress of Przemyls. But this estimate had been made before Servia had become a military factor, and this change mate- rially reduced Austrian forces in Galicia. As Aus- trian mobilization was also slow, it was expected that Austrian and Russian armies would be at the