1st Battalion in the Suvla Operations (1915): Difference between revisions
1st Battalion in the Suvla Operations (1915) (view source)
Revision as of 13:17, 30 June 2024
, 7 days agoupdated links, refs and images
m (→References / notes: removed three categories) |
(updated links, refs and images) |
||
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) | |||
Line 1:
{{1st
== Suvla and back to Cape Helles ==
After having been to the Isle of Lemnos and then on to [[Cape Helles]] on the Gallipoli peninsula where bitter fighting ensued for the domination of [[Krithia]] and [[Achi Baba]], the 1st Battalion had again left for Lemnos on the
{| class="prettytable" style="float:left; padding:10px 20px 10px 0px;"
Line 42 ⟶ 41:
The fighting had been very heavy at times, some days much worse than others and the 1st Battalion had seen their fair share of conflicts taking, or try to take, what seemed like impossible objectives against a force far greater in number. Even though some operations were not as successful as others the men had done what was expected of them, to certain degrees, under the continuing difficult circumstances. When objectives were not achieved, no one could say that they did not put every effort into completing what they had set out to do under the orders of their superior officers. The unpredictability of war can, and will always continue, to dictate what happens next in any given situation.
[[File:Suvla from Battleship Hill.jpg|thumb|
It was at this time upon their return to the mainland that the Battalion would become involved in operations carried out at Suvla Bay<ref group="lower-alpha">On the Aegean coastline of the Gallipoli peninsula, Turkey</ref> as part of the major August offensive, which would lead to the Battalion’s return to the Cape and eventual full and total evacuation of the
There was a somewhat depleted force of four Infantry Divisions, these being the 10th, 11th, 53rd and 54th, already in place but these did not number more than 30,000 men, a shortfall by any means due to the heavy casualties each of these Divisions had sustained in the previous days and weeks of fighting. As a result the 29th Division was called for to increase the force and with the addition of another division from Egypt, the strength at Suvla, under the command of Major-General de Lisle, was preparing to renew the attack. In his final despatch, General Hamilton tells us that:
=== Landing at Suvla ===
It was mid August when the Battalion embarked from V Beach, dividing the numbers into two parties; 600 men leaving at 9pm and 319 at 9.30pm. They arrived at Suvla Bay in the early hours of the following morning, the 17th, where they bivouacked at Punar. They remained there during the course of the day awaiting orders, which came through around 6pm instructing the Battalion to ready themselves to move on to the 159th Brigade HQ; meanwhile A Company was instructed to join the 158th Brigade,
=== Taking Hill 70 ===
The orders they had been waiting for arrived in the 21st, stipulating that
The situation was tense. Those coming up in support were the South Wales Borderers. Between 6 and 6.15pm this advance took place to help finally push through and take Hill 70. All were met with heavy machine gun, {{gw|rifle}} and {{gw|shrapnel}} fire from a troublesome knoll located to the left of the hill. Men from varying units made a daring assault to the right, charging the trench systems located there and temporarily taking hold. This did not last long as enfilading fire forced them out again to a position of retreat, casualties mounting in the process. Only Lieutenant Clague, out of the 15 officers taking part, remained unwounded.
=== Evacuating the Hill ===
By 8pm the companies were reorganised. They had taken on some hard fighting and many men had become casualties. It was important to establish a continuous line below the crest of the hill; this was worked on under the command of Major Nelson and Second-Lieutenant Coe. Meanwhile, stretcher bearers and water-carrying parties made their way to the firing line. After taking control of the circumstances, Major Nelson, with much forethought, judged the situation to be a hopeless one. This he reported by stating that it might be possible to hold the hill temporarily until daylight, but owing to the nature of the ground, the stony composition of the soil would hinder the construction of appropriate cover from shell fire; he could see no alternative that would not put the men in more danger than they already were. As a result, Major Nelson was, based on his report, ordered to execute a full evacuation of their positions before daylight. Leaving under the cover of night was essential to ensure the least amount of casualties.
As the evacuation took place, there had been no contact with Lieutenant Clague who was still holding out on the extreme left, at that point with only 33 of his own men remaining and a total of 50 from various other units. It was early morning on the 22nd, some time after the evacuation had started, that Lieutenant Clague received the same or similar orders to make an immediate withdrawal from his current position. This he did with great success and despite the very heavy
However, during these operations the 1st Battalion had suffered serious casualties. A total of 38 non-commissioned officers and men had been killed; 14 officers and 274 other ranks wounded. The total number of men missing amounted to 64. The following officers that were wounded are as follows:
Line 64 ⟶ 63:
{| class="prettytable" style="width:60%;"
| Captain G.C. May
| Captain J.A. Tennant*<ref
|-
Line 121 ⟶ 120:
=== A Quieter Period ===
[[File:Allied dugout at W Beach.jpg|thumb|
By this time it was the end of August. The Battalion was going to be spending much of its efforts in duties relating to preparations for the months ahead. After having been relieved by the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the men continued with dugout improvements and moved up to relieve the 2nd Hants Regiment, in addition to supporting the K.O.S.B. and the S.W.B. who were at this time in the firing line. On the 27th a working party of 200 men were sent to help unload stores at A Beach and on the 30th, a total of four officers and 200 men were sent to the K.O.S.B. and S.W.B. communication trenches to aid them in their work from 8pm till midnight. The Battalion saw the last day of the month making necessary improvements to their existing accommodation in addition to working on plans for making two nullahs habitable for the winter occupancy.
In comparison to previous months, September was fairly quiet. Fighting did not stop on account of rest from the firing line and much action, by way of minor attacks in various forms, continued throughout, however, the 1st Battalion's involvement would ''not'' seem them in similar action that had taken place on Hill 70. Their time was spent at (what is stated in the war diary) as the Suvla Bay Zone, where they rotated from reserve to firing line and back again. However, the majority of their time was spent on:
*
*
*
*
To the men it was clear that the firing line, support and second trenches were not safe by any means due to inadequate depth and the parapet not suitably bullet proof. Work in these trenches was difficult owing to the nature of the rocky subsoil, which caused many problems, yet blasting seemed to be the best solution but this still took time as there were safety issues to bear in mind. The communication trenches, which ran back to the S.W.B. nullah, had not been successfully completed to make them safe enough without the dangers of being caught in the snipers sights or killed by stray bullets. The accommodation in the two gullies where the Battalion was resident was far too cramped and so they were extended in size to better accommodate the number of men living in them. On the 21st the Battalion was supposed to have been relieved by the Royal Munster Fusliers but this was delayed for a further 24 hours. In the meantime during that evening
They did not remain there for too long and a week later they received an order to prepare to move back to Cape Helles. On the 2nd October they embarked in lighters, later transhipping to three trawlers, and sailed back to Helles. On arriving at Lancashire Landing the Battalion was met by the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General who personally showed them to their
The 2nd S.W.B. relieved the Battalion and between the 19th and end of the month time was spent in and out of the firing line, working on improving 2nd line and communication trenches along with continuous efforts in making the winter dugouts habitable. During October at
=== The turning point on the peninsula ===
It came as no surprise that the strategically difficult operations in Gallipoli were becoming far too costly for such diminutive tangible gains. In many cases no such gains were made at all and throughout residence on the peninsula many thousands of men had become wounded, were missing or had lost their lives, only to become part of another set of statistics. With the situation at hand,
Important decisions were to be made regarding the M.E.F. and on the 16th October Lord Kitchener directed General Hamilton to return home for a meeting regarding the present situation. It was here that he was informed of his successor, General Sir Charles Munro, who would command the M.E.F. from that point on. It was on the 17th that General Hamilton issued the following farewell message:
The M.E.F. received their new Commander by the 30th October and it was unmistakable that he was strongly against any further action at Gallipoli, clearly instead, taking the view of a full and total evacuation in favour of further loss of life for objectives that were becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. The decision for withdrawal from Gallipoli came from the Secretary of State for War and early November marked the start of this becoming a reality when the necessary orders were given.
=== The Full Evacuation of the M.E.F. ===
To move such a force from any location was always going to take a long time. At Gallipoli this had to be done under difficult circumstances as the risk of running high and insurmountable casualties, as a result, would be catastrophic. Many arrangements needed to made and being at the foot of a resilient enemy meant that the M.E.F. had to remain very much focused on the tasks at hand, each person, platoon, Company, Battalion, Regiment, Brigade and Division working as one to prepare for the eventual withdrawal with the minimum loss of life possible. The combined number of the forces at Suvla and ANZAC
[[File:
The firing line had to be maintained and the 1st Battalion was there once again on the 8th November doing just that. Something that probably wouldn’t haven been considered by many men was the single handed charge made by Segeant J. Cooper, who in the heat of fighting ordered his men to stand down, before taking the parapet and running over to the Turkish trenches some 120 yards distance. There he stood atop the breastwork and shot five of the trench’s occupants before making his way back under a covering fire from his comrades. It was sheer luck that he managed to survive, welcomed back to the safety of his own trench with congratulatory cheer. What drove him to do that is unknown. It could have been one of many reasons all that would lead back to him doing his duty, in a spur of the moment, heroic and even foolish, kind of way.
Line 156 ⟶ 155:
The forces at Suvla and ANZAC were decided to be the first to leave the peninsula; with five Divisions at Suvla alone this was done remarkably quickly and by the 20th they had all been withdrawn. The Divisions at Helles consisted of the 29th, 42nd, 52nd, Naval Divisions and a number of French troops. By the 28th orders were received that the M.E.F., in its entirety, was to leave Gallipoli. Before this was accomplished the 13th Division came over from Imbros to relieve the 42nd Division and during the last few days of occupancy on the peninsula the 42nd, 52nd and Naval Divisions had been withdrawn leaving only 13th and 29th Divisions remaining. The force on land was now a fraction of it former self and this meant an increasing danger from overwhelming numbers. The year 1915 was seen to the end and the introduction of the New Year brought about the final phase of the evacuation, which on the night of the 8th/9th came into play when the 1st Battalion moved into position for covering the embarkation on W Beach. Here is how they were situated:
[[File:
*
*
*
*
In the early hours on the 9th January the last remaining troops of the 29th Division fell back through the defences. The 1st Battalion, still occupying the land until the safe removal of the last troops, also fell back in the following order: C Company first, then A Company, shortly follow by C and D Companies. A, B and D Companies, along with Battalion HQ made their way to Pier 2 and embarked on lighters after which they transhipped to the destroyer ''Staunch''. Second-Lieutenant Fraser, along with 25 men remained as a small covering party. During this time the stockpile of ammunition on W Beach was destroyed, as it was quicker to do this than transport it, but as a result 5 men of the 1st Battalion were injured because of falling debris. It took some time for the Battalion in its entirety to reach Mudros Harbour as it had been separated in the process. 184 men and 4 officers were transferred from the ''Staunch'' to the ''Princess Irene'' because she was over laden and in the face of rising winds would have too dangerous. Parts of C Company turned up at scattered intervals and Second-Lieutenant Fraser and his men arrived last, safely.
Line 169 ⟶ 168:
==See also==
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
{{notes}}{{refs}}
==Sources==
*Colonel H.C. Wylly, C.B. (1925). ''[[The Border Regiment in the Great War (book)|The Border Regiment in the Great War]]''. Gale & Polden Ltd. ISBN 1847342728.
*War Diary of the 1st Battalion Border Regiment (1915). National Archives Catalogue Ref: WO/95/4311.
[[Category:1st Battalion]]
|