Lemberg 157 could cut such Russian advance off from Russian territory, envelop and surround It. Because of this fact Russian mobilization began, not in Russian territory nearest Posen, that Is nearest to Berlin, but far back, almost exactly on the line be- tween Memel and Czernowitz, while It was left to Warsaw and a number of other fortresses west of this mobilization line to hold back any Austro-Ger- man attempt to occupy Russian Poland, which was defended only by covering troops. Now consider what had happened. First of all there was a Russian offensive stepping over into East Prussia, at the moment when the German ad- vance had reached Brussels, that is, on August 20. This advance penetrated far Into East Prussia, In- vested Koenlgsberg, inflicted a number of defeats upon the Germans, almost reached the Vistula bar- rier of fortresses and produced a real panic in East Prussia and grave apprehension In Berlin. All the fruits of this success were presently lost in the severe defeat suffered by the Russians at Tannenburg, where two army corps were destroyed. The real value of this operation, which ultimately proved to have been a temporary expedient, is to be found In the fact that it compelled the withdrawal of army corps from the west before the decisive moment in the advance to Paris. Turning to the south now, it will be noted that a great Russian Army coming west on a line between Czernowitz and Lemberg met and defeated the main